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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of decentralization on corruption in
a hierarchical organization, where decentralization is intended as the
delegation of control power to lower levels in a hierarchy. Decentral-
ization causes a loss in control to the higher levels, thus curbing their
incentives to monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also
lowers the expected gains from corruption as, following decentraliza-
tion, the number of individuals who are in charge of a single decision
is reduced. It is then more likely that corrupt agents are called to
bear the consequences of their actions. Hence, decentralization, al-
though creating agency problems inside an organization, can help in
controlling corruption.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, the discretionary power held by members of an organization is
regarded as one of the major sources of corrupt behavior. Klitgaard (1988)
states that corruption depends positively on the amount of monopoly power
and discretion enjoyed by the participants to an organization.
This way of addressing the issue does not consider that often individuals
with more monopoly power are also the ones who bear the highest oppor-
tunity cost from corruption. Moreover, in the event that monopoly power
allowed higher rents from corruption, a more powerful individual attracts
also more attention from corruption detectors. All these elements can lead
to situations where increasing discretion discourages corruption. Individuals
holding power face a trade off, where they have to balance the increased op-
portunities (and therefore value) to be corrupt with the larger burden they
hold.
Decentralisation transfers control power and discretion to lower hierar-
chical layers, thus leading them to consider such trade-off. As a result, the
impact of decentralisation on the extent of corruption affecting an organisa-
tion depends on the direction towards which the trade off is resolved. The
problem analyzed in this paper is how an organization should be designed to
resolve the trade off in the sense of a reduction in corruption.1
As Aghion and Tirole (1997) point out effectively, there are two distinct
sources of decisional power. Firstly, there is the power legally and explicitly
attributed by means of a contract (control power or formal authority).2 Sec-
ondly, there is the power that derives from the knowledge of crucial informa-
tion (real authority). By revealing such information strategically, members
to an organisation can redirect the use of productive assets towards their own
goals, even when they lack formal authority. However, centralized decision
making certainly reduces the likelihood that subordinates are called to make
a decision, which lowers the subordinates’ incentives to work.3
The same is true for any superior layers that had the task to monitor sub-
ordinates’ behaviour and detect corrupt activities. When the degree of decen-
1It is therefore assumed that corruption is harmful and should be minimised.This is in
line with the most recent literature, which shows that corruption has highly indesirable
effects on economic systems. It affects negatively the rate of growth of a country’s GDP,
the productivity of public investments and also the allocation of talent (see Mauro, 1995,
Tanzi, 1998, Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
2Formal authority is the power to exert the residual rights of control, i.e. to decide
in all the situations not contemplated by the initial, inevitably incomplete contract that
links each member to the organization. This kind of power can be transferred from the
owners to the subordinates by means of an act of delegation.
3This effect is what is called ”basic trade off” in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
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tralization is high, superiors have little incentive to perform their screening
and detection activities because they have little power to stop subordinates’
decisions. Decentralization reduces the amount of monitoring, leaving local
offices more freedom to pursue their corrupt activities.4
Decentralization has another important implication: it concentrates deci-
sional powers in the hands of one individual, eliminating overlaps in compe-
tence and makes it easier to identify who took a certain decision. An agent
operating at a low level of a hierarchy can always hope that the consequences
of his corrupt act will not fall on his head if he is not the sole accountable
for it. In fact, if superiors have formal authority upon that decision, the
implementation of the agent’s choice can be stopped. In other words, even if
he has performed the illegal act he was bribed for (suggesting a bad project),
the project can be rejected at higher levels and the agent will not bear the
losses from his inefficient choice. This is not true anymore if he is in charge
of the decision. Therefore, decentralization allows a more precise allocation
of the consequences of corrupt acts. Agency problems, instead of being the
main cause of corruption and agents’ opportunistic behavior, under certain
conditions can be helpful in alleviating them.
On the other hand, assume the reward for detectors is directly propor-
tional to the amount of bribes they discover.5 If the manager benefits more
from uncovering more bribes, decentralization can improve her incentives to
monitor corrupt agents, thus increasing the probability that they are caught
and the expected costs from corruption.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model.
Section 3 characterizes the consequences of decentralization when only the
lowest hierarchical layer is corruptible. Section 4 depicts the optimal anti
corruption policy. Section 5 extends the model to include monetary incentives
and punishment schemes and shows that the conclusions obtained are robust
to the introduction of these ”more traditional” incentive schemes. Section
6 considers the problem of a corrupt top bureaucrat. Section 7 adds a new
dimension to the moral hazard problem, analyzing the case where the size of
the bribe paid to agents increases with decentralisation. Section 8 concludes.
4In this sense, what stated by Rose-Ackerman (1978), that decentralization increases
the risk of corruption since it limits review and detection, is confirmed. Decentralization
decreases monitoring by superiors also because of another, more frequently cited, reason.
It renders access to crucial information recorded by subordinates more difficult (it is more
difficult to check their books and balances). However, while this problem can be overcome
(albeit partially) by the introduction of accounting standards and transparency rules, weak
incentives are more difficult to solve.
5This can either imply that detectors are allowed to keep a percentage of the bribes
they retrieve or that, implicitly, their prestige and career inside the organisation are linked
to the amount of corruption they discover.
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1.1 Related Literature
The positive relation between a member’s monopoly power and the extent
of corruption is stated also by Shleifer and Vishny (1993). When many of-
ficers are in charge of a decision, they exert a multiple veto power on each
other, preventing the others from providing the corrupt service, reducing the
”value” of their act. In their model, decentralization unambiguously increases
corruption, eliminating this veto problem. Banerjee (1997) claims that public
bureaucracies are affected by corruption, red tape and weak incentives just
because governments acts to improve social welfare. Paradoxically, inefficien-
cies and corruption would not occur if the government were not interested
in social welfare, since the bureaucrats, allocating scarce resources to those
people who have the highest ability to pay, would not be acting illegally.6
Bac (1996) investigates the relation among the structure of hierarchies, the
monitoring technology and the extent of internal and external corruption.
Structure of hierarchies means the number of layers and the span of control
for each layer and not the allocation of power, as in our model. He concludes
that a flatter hierarchy is to be preferred when monitoring is not specialized
(a given monitoring effort implies the same detection probability on all sub-
ordinates, which is equivalent to saying that there are economies of scale in
monitoring), whereas a steeper structure reduces the risk of internal corrup-
tion, because the total amount of bribes that could be used to corrupt the
manager is lower.
Other contributions have considered the interaction of corruption at dif-
ferent levels of a hierarchy. Cadot (1987) shows, in a dynamic model, how
the combination of strong power - e.g. regulatory or granting permits - and
low wages for public officers create ”basic incentives” for corruption, conclu-
sion in line with the observation of high levels of corruption in many Third
World countries. Basu, Bhattacharya and Mishra (1992) consider that not
only lower officers have the problem of being caught after accepting a bribe,
but also their corrupt superiors. Corruption becomes a recursive problem.
A good deterrence policy is that of increasing the probability that a corrupt
officer is caught rather than stiffening the penalty imposed.
6As Banerjee (1997), also Acemoglu and Verdier (1997) point out that the crucial issues
in explaining corruption are agency problems between the government and its bureaucrats
and the inability of the government to make interventions without recurring to a bureau-
cracy. The opportunity for the bureaucrats to gain rents from corruption can lead to
misallocation of talents (as these rents will attract not only those who are more able to
perform a particular activity, but also others, who would perform better if assigned to
other tasks).
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2 The Model
Consider an organization consisting of three hierarchical levels. The first
layer is a principal, who lacks either the expertise or the time to perform
the activity the organization has been set up for. She then delegates all her
control power to the lower layers. The second hierarchical level is a central
office (top manager or manager) who has the task to coordinate the activities
performed by the agents and to monitor their behavior to detect corruption.
The third level consists of N local offices (agents), whose task is to screen a
certain number of potential projects and to report information about them
to the central office. Both the top bureaucrat and the local offices can be
corrupt.
To minimize corruption, the principal decides on the allocation of control,
choosing whether to delegate the power to select a project to the central office
or to the local ones. In the first case the central office checks the information
reported by the agents and decides which projects to implement. In the
second case, which correspond to a more decentralized setting, this decision
remains in the hands of the local offices and the superior layer performs only
tasks of general supervision and detection of corruption.
Organizational Structure A hierarchy is formed by three layers.
1. A principal (either a private body, like the shareholders of a bank or of a
firm, or a public institution, for instance a legislative body) and whose
aim is to reduce corruption7. The principal decides the allocation of
authority to the hierarchical layers below, chooses the penalties to im-
pose on corrupt agents and the compensation policies for the managers
who report cases of corruption.
2. An organization , consisting of a top manager (”she”, also called ”cen-
tral office”), who controls and monitors a lower layer of N agents.
3. The lower layer of N agents, each (he) in charge of one productive
activity and each representing a ”local” or ”sectorial” office. Agents
are in direct contact with ”clients” or ”project proponent”.
7In the framework considered here, there is no trade off between the subordinates’
performance and the level of corruption. As a result, the principal’s objective function
is separable in performance and corruption and these two problems can be tackled inde-
pendently of each other. This would not be true if, for istance, the subordinate’s effort
depended on the extent of corruption in the organization.
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The productive activity consists of selecting and realizing many different
projects.
There are many institutions (either private or public) whose activity can
be represented by the model depicted above. The most direct example is
that of a financial intermediary or a bank. There are N local offices or
divisions, each specialized in a particular geographical area or in a given
sector, who have to select projects to finance among many applicants. They
screen the projects proposed and report the information they find to the
central office. As there is always a risky component in a project, a negative
outcome can be either the result of ”bad luck” or of a ”bad” project, therefore
a local office can decide to accept a bribe from a project of low quality
and report false information to the superior layer. Another example is that
of a public institution who has to implement projects in a given area, for
instance, street lighting or motorways. In order to implement these projects,
the institution stipulates procurement contracts with external firms, who
have to be selected, in principle by following criteria of economic efficiency.
Again, local offices (plausibly those situated in the area which is going to
benefit from the project) have to screen applicants, who can bribe them to
be chosen.
The principal lacks either the expertise or the time to perform the pro-
ductive activity directly and therefore has to delegate it. Before production
starts, the principal chooses the structure of the organization, deciding the
allocation of formal authority.
In that follows it will be assumed that the the agent has formal authority
(decentralization) with probability z, whereas with probability 1− z the top
manager is in control (centralization). Probably, the two most common cases
are z = 0 (full centralization) and z = 1 (full decentralization), however,
modeling the degree of decentralization as a continuous variable helps when
comparative statics is performed. This procedure has no influence on the
quality of the results, since a result verified for any z must be true also for
z ∈ {0, 1} .
To interpret z, it could be imagined that the allocation of control depends
on an external event, which occurs with probability z and whose occurrence
takes place or is observed only after the parties have exerted effort but be-
fore project implementation.8 It could also be imagined that each productive
activity consists of a continuum of elementary decisions, to be taken simul-
taneously, so that z represents the share of those decisions delegated to the
agent. By taking these decisions according to his own interests, the agent can
jeopardize the top manager’s objectives and prevent her from taking certain
8This would be a case of contingent control in the spirit of Aghion and Bolton, (1992).
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actions and z represents the share of veto powers in the agent’s hands.
If the top manager has formal authority, she is in the position to overrule
the agents and pursue her own goals. Conversely, if the agents have authority,
they are in charge of the decisional process in the activity they control and
the top manager cannot intervene to change their decisions, even if they are
at odds with her personal interests.9
The principal can never be corrupt. This assumption is certainly plausible
in case the organisation described were a private financial institution. It is
hard to think that shareholders, for example, especially those in control of
the majority stake, risked bankruptcy for a small fee. However, even in the
case of public institutions, if the aim is the elimination if corruption, there
must be some corruption free body, like, for example, the civil society.10
Initially, it will be assumed that only agents can be corrupt. This hy-
pothesis will be removed later.
Projects At the beginning of the production process, each agent is ran-
domly matched with a ”client”, who proposes a project.
There are either good or bad projects. Each type occurs with ex ante
probability 12 .
Payoff from good projects. All good projects are equal. The top man-
ager’s profit from a good project is G1 > 0, whereas the agent’s payoff
is g1 > 0 and the principal’s is G.
Payoff from bad projects. All bad projects yield −G2 and −g2 (G2, g2 >
0) respectively to the principal and to the agent. Their payoff thus is
negative. In addition to that, bad projects also yield a loss L to the
principal. Without bribery, a bad project would never be chosen.
It is assumed here that the outcome of a project, by itself, does not
constitute evidence of corruption. This can be justified by assuming that the
9This is the situation typically considered in the literature on agency. In that literature,
delegation occurs because the principal has not either the time or the ability to undertake
that activity. This explains why the agent can bias her decisions and actions toward his
own goals, thus behaving with moral hazard. Either the principal lacks the information to
check that the agent’s decisions harm her interest (hidden information) or she is not able
to observe the agent actions (hidden action). The result of this informational asymmetry
is that the agent not only has the required formal authority to make decisions, as a
consequence of delegation, but also the real authority.
10It has been assumed here that the highest layer in the hierarchy cannot be bribed.
In case such hypothesis were released the organization would be shaped to maximise the
principal gains. This case will be analysed in Chapter 3.
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top manager needs evidence to sue an agent, even if she could infer from the
project’s outcome that corruption took place.11
Production If agents recognise a good project, they always suggest it. If
the project is bad, instead, two cases can occur: if the agent is honest, he
reports honestly what he found to the top manager, who then discards the
project. If the agent is corrupt, he lies to the superior layer, stating that the
project is good and suggesting its implementation.
The top manager verifies the reported information. This represents ex
ante monitoring in the sense of Aghion and Tirole (1997): the superior mon-
itors to acquire information that allows her to evaluate the decisions taken
by the subordinate. In case she did not agree and has formal authority she
can impose a different course of action. It is therefore monitoring that takes
place before the agent exerts his actions and not after, that would be a mere
assessment of the results obtained.12
If the manager herself is corrupt, an agent may try to collude with her,
either to avoid being monitored in the first place or not to be denouced if
found out having suggested a bad project.
The flow of information goes upstream and screening is sequential. The
superior layers have no opportunity to collect information directly because
they have no direct contact with the projects and they can only verify the
information reported by the subordinates.
The manager checks the information about one specific project with effort
eM (where the subscript M stays for manager) and learns with probability
eB the true type of the project suggested, eM ∈ [eM , eM ] , 0 < eM < eM < 1.
She repeats the same activity for all recommended projects, bearing a cost
equal to cM(NReM) = NR
e2M
2 , where N
R is the number of recommended
projects.
The probability 1 − eM then measures the extent of the agent’s real au-
thority, because it is when such circumstances occur that, no matter who
actually holds formal authority, the agent has full decisional power, being
the other party uninformed.
If the agents have formal authority over the project choice, they choose
11Alternatively, it can be thought that the agent makes a mistake when assessing a
project’s quality. This feature can be introduced explicitly into the model by assuming
that the agent observes a signal about the project’s nature, signal correct with a given
probability γ > 0. It would always be possible that the project is bad even if the agent
is honest and observing a bad outcome would not imply that bribery occurred. However,
this complicates notation without changing the nature of results.
12This is the typical definition of monitoring in the incentive literature, ex post moni-
toring, where a more appropriate term would be auditing (see Baron and Besanko, 1984).
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whether to implement the project proposed by the client they have been
matched with according to the information they have.
Timing
1. The principal chooses the allocation of control power in the organisa-
tion.
2. The agent is matched with a client and screens the project he offers.
3. If bad, the client offers the agent a bribe.
4. The agent decides whether to accept and then communicates to the top
manager the information he has and, when he has formal authority, the
projects he is going to implement.
5. The top manager screens the information obtained by all agents.
6. If the top manager discovers a bad, she reports the agent to the prin-
cipal and receives a share s of the bribe as a compensation. If the
manager is informed and has formal authority (and is not corrupt), she
stops the bad project. If the agent has formal authority, even when he
has been caught, the bad project is implemented.
7. All good projects are implemented, plus unrecognized bad. All projects
recommended are implemented if agents have formal authority.
The manager examines only the information the agent reports. This
is therefore a case of sequential screening, where superiors screen only the
projects not previously rejected by some lower layer.13The agents have there-
fore a sort of filtering power, which make them an indispensable figure to have
on one’s side in the client’s eyes.
In addition, only clients with bad projects bribe. This hypothesis is
quite plausible as implementing a good is always desirable and, if the clients
know the nature of the project they propose, they will probably try hard to
demonstrate their nature. For example, if they are denied implementation
after refusing to pay a bribe, they can denounce the agent. However, also a
scenario where both project types bribe is possible. Agents could avoid to
pronounce a clear rejection for a good project that refuses to pay and simply
13This model is therefore different in this respect from Aghion and Tirole (1997), who
assume simultaneous screening. Moreover, the assumption of sequential screening implies
that the top bureaucrat never has real authority, since production takes place only when
the agent has information.
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delay implementation, until the client resolves to pay ”to oil the wheels”. To
simplify the model, only bad offers a bribe, but the alternative hypothesis
would not change substantially our results.14 The timing is depicted in Figure
1.
Preferences and Utility Functions The manager and the agents are
risk neutral. Agents can be either corrupt or honest. In general, here it
is assumed that being corrupt is not an intrinsic quality of the agent but
depends on the specific circumstances agents find themselves in. Each agent
has a private-information cost h of being corrupted, cost that measures the
agent’s degree of honesty: the higher h, the more honest the agent. If an
agent is offered a bribe high enough, he becomes corrupt.
In order to describe the parties’ utility functions it should be distinguished
between the cases of non-corrupt and corrupt agents.
No corruption. If all agents are honest, only good projects are imple-
mented. In this case there is perfect coincidence of interests between each
agent and the top manager.15
Each agent has an expected payoff UA = g12 , whereas the manager’s total
payoff is
UM = N
[
G1
2
− e
2
M
2
]
(1)
hence, the manager exerts only the minimum effort eM .
Corruption. In this case, both good and bad projects are suggested,
bad provided that the clients who propose them offer the agents a bribe b
sufficiently high. The bribe is paid to the agent to report the wrong infor-
mation. Corruption then means that a bad project is presented as a good
to the superior. Moreover, the content of the information transmitted can
be verified by the client. It is not possible for the agent to accept the bribe,
promising to lie and report the truth instead (that the project is bad), telling
to the client afterwards that the manager has found out the project’s real
nature and has cancelled it. All the investment decisions are quite public in
nature and cannot be concealed.
When the top manager has formal authority, if she finds a bad, she can
stop its implementation, which is a typical case of the exercise of veto power.
14Since type 2 projects yield an expected negative payoff and the bribe is paid before the
agent reports his information, the latter could cheat, take the bribe and then report the
project as type 2, therefore stopping its implementation. However, this would jeopardize
any future attempt to ask for a bribe, ”spoiling ” the agent’s reputation.
15This case corresponds to the first best.
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Moreover, on the basis of that information, the manager can take the agent
to court. The bribe is confiscated (a share s ≤ 1 given to the top manager
as a reward for cooperation) and the agent is fired.16. If the agent is corrupt,
the probability of being caught depends on the central office’s effort and is
equal to eM .
When the agents have formal authority a bad project cannot be stopped
(by the same definition of formal authority). However, if the top manager
has evidence that the project is of bad, an agent can be convicted and the
bribe confiscated. The manager will get a share sb as a compensation.
Each agent’s h of being corrupted is distributed uniformly over the inter-
val [0, 1] . The higher h the less prone to corruption an agent is.
The agent’s gain from being corrupt is
ΠA = (1− eM)(b− g2)− eMzg2 − h (2)
if the agent decides to accept a bad project and the top manager has not
the knowledge to stop him, the agent suffers the expected loss g2, but gains
the bribe b. When the manager has information and the project suggested is
bad, the bribe is confiscated but the loss g2 is born as long as the principal
has not formal authority to stop the project.
From (2) it can be seen that a corrupt agent, if caught by the top manager,
prefers to be stopped, that is he prefers not to have formal authority. This
happens because a bribe here is paid just to induce him to lie, reporting false
information to the top manager. When the agent is caught and the project
stopped, although the bribe is confiscated, at least he does not bear the loss
g2.
A corrupt agent (characterized by h ≤ h˜) has the following payoff
UCA =
g1
2
+
1
2
ΠA (3)
which, due to Assumption 2 and given that ΠA > 0 for a corrupt agent, is
always positive.
The manager chooses her monitoring effort after having observed the
agent’s report, which can either be ”yes, the project is good” or ”no, it
should be discarded”. Given the structure of the model, when a project
is rejected it is never a good, as even the most corrupt agent would never
discard a good. The manager never checks a negative report and monitors
only the projects accompanied by a ”yes” report.
16It could also be thought that the agent is jailed upon discovery of corruption. In
that case, however, his payoff should include an additional loss term. To avoid making
notation heavier, given that this would not enrich the results, the possibility of the agent
being jailed is not considered.
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If the loss G2 from a bad project is small enough, when the manager is
not able to find any information about the suggested project, she prefers to
rubberstamp the agent’s suggestion rather than implementing no project and
this regardless to the fact that the principal’s loss G can be rather high.
This requires that the expected return from a project chosen by an agent
(who could be either honest or corrupt) is always positive, as the following
assumption states
Assumption 1 1
1+h˜
G1 − h˜1+h˜G2 > 0.
Assumption 1 represents the top manager’s expected payoff from a project
recommended by an agent of unknown honesty. The probability that the
project is good conditional to having been recommended is 1
1+h˜
and a good
project yields G1. The conditional probability that the project is bad and
yield G2 is h˜1+h˜ .
17 When Assumption 1 is satisfied, if the manager has not
information, even if she has formal authority, the agent will actually take the
final decision (exert real authority).
Given the diffusion of corruption in the hierarchy, h˜, and that all the
agents exert positive effort, the top manager’s payoff, conditional on a good
report, is
UM = N
(
1 + h˜
2
)[
G1
1 + h˜
+
h˜
1 + h˜
(eMsb− (1− eM(1− z))G2)− e
2
M
2
]
(4)
where N
(
1+h˜
2
)
= NR, the number of recommended projects. The first term
between square parentheses in (4) represents the expected gain if the project
is good (probability of a good project conditional on being suggested per gain
from a good project). The second term is the expected payoff if the project
is bad. If the central office has neither information nor formal authority, she
cannot overrule the agent who proposes a bad project. Therefore, she bears
the expected loss G2. Conversely, if she has information, she bears the loss
only to the extent the agent has formal authority and cannot be stopped
17The conditional probability that a project is good given that it is recommended is
obtained by Bayes rule P (good | recomm) = P (good∩recomm)P (recomm) . A project is recommended
either if it is good or if the agent is corrupt. Then P (recomm) = 1+h˜2 . Given that all
good projects are recommended, the joint probability that a project is good and rec-
ommended is 12 . Then P (good | recomm) = 11+h˜ . Similarly, the conditional probability
P (bad | recomm) = P (bad∩recomm)P (recomm) = h˜1+h˜ since only corrupt agents recommend bad
projects and the probability that a agent is corrupt is h˜.
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(the share of control powers in the agent’s hands is z). In any case, the top
manager is rewarded with a share sb of the bribe each time she denounces
the agent, which happens if she is informed. The third term is the cost of
monitoring.18
3 Can decentralisation decrease corruption?
The principal pursues the objective of reducing corruption. Therefore it
will set the values of the policy tools at its disposal (namely, the degree of
decentralization z and the share s to be transferred to the manager upon
denunciation) to minimize equilibrium corruption19 h˜∗(z, s). After z and s
have been chosen, production occurs: the agent reports his information and
the manager verifies it. Solving this game backwards, the interaction between
the manager and the agents is considered first.
As long as ΠA > 0 in (2) the agent accepts the bribe. The value of h that
makes an agent just indifferent between being corrupt and not being corrupt,
given b and eM is found by solving ΠA = 0 and is
h˜ = (b− g2)− eM(b− (1− z)g2) (5)
The value h˜ represents a threshold such that all the agents with h < h˜
choose to be corrupt, whereas all those with h > h˜ prefer to remain honest. If
F (h˜) = Pr(h < h˜) (in this case just equal to h˜ due to the uniform distribution
over the interval [0, 1]), F (h˜) represents also the share of corrupt agents,
hence the diffusion of corruption.
18It is assumed here that the top bureaucrat obtains a reward if she reports a corrupt
act to the police. This certainly enhances her incentives to work hard. However, this is
not a crucial assumption, as it can be shown that the results obtained here would still hold
if this assumption were removed and the bureaucrat did not obtain any compensation for
reporting corrupt acts. In fact, checking expression (7), it can be seen that e = h˜(1−z)G22N ,
which is lower than the effort exerted when the reward is given, but qualitatively shows
the same behaviour (increasing in h˜, decreasing in z). It has the (somehow undesirable)
property of yielding an effort e = 0 when z = 1, as the manager has no incentives to
monitor if she cannot intervene. To avoid this some kind of monetary incentives has to be
introduced and bribe sharing is a possibility.
19The hypothesis that the principal minimizes corruption instead of maximizing a more
general function measuring the welfare for the whole organization can be regarded as
too simplistic. This hypothesis can be easily defended. First of all, minimization of
corruption could be just one goal among many different ones. Moreover, as pointed out
above, corruption entails a loss for the entire organization, therefore it is plausible to
think that a function representing the organization’s welfare should be decreasing in the
diffusion of corruption. Finally, it can be shown that including a welfare function for the
entire organization does not change the results dramatically.
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From (5), in order for h˜ to be positive, it has to be that
e < e˜B =
b− g2
b− g2(1− z) < 1 (6)
Notice that 0 < e˜B < 1, if b > g2 and given that z < 1. Then, if the loss
to the agent is larger than the bribe, collusion is not possible. Conversely,
if b is large, a relevant value e˜B always exists. We therefore introduce the
following assumption.
Assumption 2 b > g2.
Direct observation of (5) reveals two important properties of this model.
Lemma 1. Given eM , h˜ is decreasing in z.
Proof. From differentiation of expression (5), taking eM as given.
Conversely, it can be said that a decrease in the agent’s formal authority
(a decrease in z) increases corruption.
Lemma 2. As eM increases, h˜ decreases, reducing corruption.
Proof. By Assumption 2 b − g2 > 0, then b − (1 − z)g2 > 0, as 1 − z < 1.
Then an increase in eM always reduces h˜. Since the corrupt agents are those
with h < h˜, this induces less agents to be corrupt. Moreover, if H(h˜) is the
Pr(h < h˜) (in this case just equal to h˜ due to the uniform distribution over
the interval [0, 1]) and the share of corrupt agent in the hierarchy, a decrease
in the agent’s real authority decreases corruption.
Given z and s, from (4), the first order condition is20
eM =
h˜
1 + h˜
[sb+ (1− z)G2] (7)
that reveals that eM is increasing in h˜, the diffusion of corruption in the so-
ciety. Moreover, eM is increasing in the share of recommended projects 1+h˜2 .
This represents an overload effect. As the number of supervised projects
increases (thus increasing the manager’s span of control) the costs of moni-
toring them becomes higher and the manager’s effort diminishes.
20It can be checked directly from (4) that the second order condition for a maximum is
satisfied.
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Lemma 3. (i) The manager’s reaction function e(h˜) is overall increasing
and strictly concave. (ii) corruption as a function of e, h˜(e), is discontinuous
at e = e˜B. It decreases linearly in eM for eM ∈ [0, e˜M) and then reaches 0 for
eM ∈ (e˜M , 1] .
Proof. Part (i) proved by differentiation of (7). Part (ii) follows from (5).
When eM < e˜M , then ∂h˜∂eM < 0 by Lemma 2 and
∂2h˜
∂e2M
= 2(1 − z)v > 0. At
eM = e˜M , h˜(e˜M) = 0 and when eM > e˜M then h˜ < 0, so that, by definition
of h˜, h˜ = 0.
The schedules eM(h˜) and h˜(eM) are represented in Figure 2 below, where h˜
is measured on the vertical axis and φ(eM) = e−1M (h˜). The existence of a value
e˜M for eM such that for eM > e˜M there is no corruption means that there
exist levels of monitoring effort in the admissible range such that corruption
is inhibited. However, as it is also possible to infer from Figure 2, such
levels of monitoring never occur in equilibrium. The following proposition
formalises this result.
Proposition 1. If b − g2 > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium (e∗M , h˜∗),
with e∗M ∈ [0, e˜M) and h˜∗ ∈ [0,min {b− g2, 1}].
Proof. Given that b > g2 by Assumption 2, if eM = 0, h˜(0) = min {b− g2, 1} .
By Lemma 3, h˜(eM) is decreasing and convex for eM ∈ [0, e˜M) , at e˜M the
schedule h˜(eM) reaches 0. Conversely, the inverse of the manager’s reaction
function, h˜−1M (eM) is always increasing and convex in eM . Therefore, the
two schedules will cross at a point (e∗M , h˜∗M), with e∗M ∈ [0, e˜M) and h˜∗ ∈
[0,min {b− g2, 1}].
Proposition 1 implies that if the bribe is high enough (or, conversely, if
the loss due to a bad project is not too large), at the equilibrium detection is
not enough to deter collusion, which then is always positive. Given the size
of the losses g2 and G2, the bribe b and the degree of decentralization z, this
equilibrium is unique.
4 Policies to reduce corruption
At the stage before, the principal has to choose z and s, 0 ≤ s, z ≤ 1 to
minimize equilibrium corruption h˜∗(z, s).
The following result is immediate to check.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, for any z, h˜∗(z, s) is always decreasing in s.
Proof. See Appendix.
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From the mere point of view of reducing corruption then, setting s∗ = 1
is optimal, even if, in a more general setting, the principal could prefer to
reinvest a share of the proceeds from fighting corruption in, say, improving
police equipment or hiring external auditors and detectives.21
Proposition 2. (i) Decentralisation always decreases the manager’s effort
in equilibrium. (ii) If dh˜
∗
dz < 0 then
∂h˜∗
∂z >
∂h˜∗
∂eM
∂e∗M
∂z .
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 2, decentralisation always decreases the man-
ager’s effort in equilibrium. If this reduction in monitoring (hence in the
probability of punishment) is large enough, the agent’s accountability is lower
and a more decentralized structure is also more corrupt. However, Lemma 2
shows that the direct impact of a reduction in z on h˜ goes in the direction of
reducing corruption. This is because the opportunity cost of recommending
a bad project increases with monopoly power. If this second effect offsets the
lower accountability, the power to decide discourages corruption.
In this section, subordinates are provided incentives by means of delega-
tion of decisional power. It could also happen that the principal imposes a
fine to the parties when they are caught being corrupt.22 Monetary incentives
and penalties will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section.
Finally, work overload (namely, the increase in N, the number of agents
monitored by the central office), reducing eM , favors the diffusion of cor-
ruption in equilibrium. Increasing the central office’s work overload always
worsens the problem of corruption.
5 Corruption and monetary incentives
In this section, it will be shown that the model presented above is robust
to the introduction of monetary incentive schemes and, specifically, that de-
centralization and monetary penalties have the same impact on corruption,
being substitute policies.
21It can be shown that, from a quantitative point of view, a more general specification
would entail a different value 0 < ψ∗ < 1 and a different z. Qualitatively, the conclusions
presented in this section would be confirmed.
22The penalty is imposed only to the extent that a party has formal authority or, in
the case of the central office, that she failed in collecting the evidence about the suggested
project.
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The principal, when an agent is found out being corrupt and denounced
by the central office, imposes a penalty on him. For a penalty equal to Π,
the agent’s expected payoff from corruption is
MA(P ) = (1− eM)(b− g2)− eM(zg2 + P )− h (8)
In order to discourage corruption, the principal should impose a penalty
P ≥ P 0 such that MA(P ) ≤ 0. Given that the government does not observe
h, which is private information for the agent, P 0 solves
(1− eM)(b− g2)− eM(zg2 + P 0) = 0 (9)
It can be verified from (9) that the minimum penalty to discourage cor-
ruption, P 0 can be decreased when the degree of decentralization, z is higher.
This implies that decentralization and monetary penalties23 are substitutes
in fighting corruption: z and P are working in the same direction.
The existence of constitutional rules or laws may impose an upper bound
to the maximum penalty applicable. For instance, a penalty may not be
allowed to be higher than P , where P < P 0. In that case, punishment alone
cannot minimize corruption and setting an appropriate organizational struc-
ture may help.
Another way of designing a penalty scheme could be that of considering
g2 and G2 as fines imposed by the principal on the manager and on the
agent when a bad project is implemented, fines that are proportional to the
amount of formal authority held by each of them. Hence g2 = g2(z) and
G2 = G2(1− z) and g′(z), G′(1− z) > 0.24
In such case, the agent’s benefit from corruption would be given again by
(8), with the difference that, now, the loss g2 depends on z.
Again, as in equilibrium there is no corruption, eM = eM and penalties
and decentralization are substitutes. Decentralization helps in overcoming
incentive problems due to the presence of limited liability constraints.25
23It has been chosen here to interpret P as a monetary fine imposed on the agent.
However, P may represent any form of punishment that causes a loss for the agent, like
being sent to jail.
24A simple functional form that embodies this idea could be linear, where g2(z) = zxL
and G2(1 − z) = (1 − z)xL, where L is the loss the entire organization suffers as a
consequence of a bad project and x is the share of such loss that the principal demands
the responsible to refund.
25A similar result can be found in Felli (1996), who, however, gives to the term ”del-
egation” a very specific meaning. According to Felli, delegation is the transfer of (part)
of the rights to be residual claimant from the principal to a subordinate layer. Felli then
shows that, in a three-level hierarchy, (partial) delegation to the intermediate layer eases
the incentive problems of both the subordinate layers, given that the intermediate layer is
risk neutral.
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The results in this section can be reinterpreted in the light of the economic
theory of the optimal enforcement of law (recently surveyed by Polinsky
and Shavell, 1998). One of the main results of that theory is contained
in Polinsky and Shavell (1979). They show that, when potential offenders
are risk averse and the costs of catching them are high, there is a trade off
between the probability of being caught (detection) and the magnitude of the
punishment imposed. A very high punishment when detection is imperfect
may have the perverse effect of increasing moral hazard in offenders. In
our model, Polinsky and Shavell’s trade off can be reinterpreted as follows.
The amount of the penalty is directly proportional to the loss suffered when
a bad project is chosen, whereas detection decreases with decentralization.
Therefore, increasing decentralization increases the expected penalty (loss),
at the same time lowering detection.
6 A corrupt manager
If the manager finds out that a project is bad and that the agent who recom-
mended it is corrupt, she demands a side payment in order not to denounce
him and, when she has formal authority, not to stop the project. If the pay-
ment is made, the project is completed and the agent retains his job. If the
manager holds all the bargaining power, she will ask for the entire bribe paid
to the agent, b.26 The agent prefers if the manager is corruptible. His bribe
is confiscated and he always suffers the loss from a bad project but he does
not lose his job.27
The timing of the game is modified as follows
1. the manager chooses z and s
2. the agent is matched with a client
3. if bad, the client offers a bribe
4. the agent decides whether to accept and then reports to the manager
the information he has, and, when he has formal authority, the decisions
he has taken
5. the manager screens the information from all agents
26It can be checked that different distributions of the bargaining power would not change
the results.
27In the incorruptible manager case, the agent bears g2 only when he has formal au-
thority, because in centralised decisional settings the manager would stop a bad project.
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6. if corruption is detected, the manager is paid the entire agent’s bribe
b, which, if accepted, guarantees project implementation28
7. selected projects are implemented.
Clearly, the manager is corrupt if the bribe is high enough to compensate
her against all losses. Then the bribe b must satisfy the following assump-
tion29
Assumption 1 b > G2.
The manager’s payoff is
UCMM = N
1 + h˜
2
[
G1
1 + h˜
+
h˜
1 + h˜
(eMb−G2)− e
2
M
2
]
(10)
where the header CM stands for ”corrupt manager”. The number of rec-
ommended projects30 is N 1+h˜2 . Given that they are recommended, there is
a conditional probability equal to 1
1+h˜
that each of them is good and a con-
ditional probability h˜
1+h˜
that each is bad. In this latter case, an informed
manager gets the entire bribe b (and not only a share s of it), but also the
loss G2.
Differentiating (10), the first order condition for eM yields
eCMM =
h˜
1 + h˜
b (11)
which is increasing in h˜ and b. More interestingly, (11) is invariant with re-
spect to z, as, no matter who is in control, a bad project, when recommended,
always finds its way towards implementation and the loss G2 is always born.
28Notice that here we consider only ex-post corruption, namely corruption takes place
only after the manager monitored, once the agent has been discovered. There is also
the possibility of ex-ante corruption, that is corruption before monitoring takes place.
However, since trying to corrupt the manager would reveal the project’s nature, the results
and the size of the transfer would remain the same.
29It is assumed here that the manager ”has always her own price”, in the sense that
any moral restraints or prestige considerations can be put aside in front of a generous
enough offer. In the model economy here represented, this is not a crucial assumption.
This is equivalent to assuming that the manager’s private cost of corruption is constant
and normalised to zero.
30A share 1+h˜2 of the N available projects is recommended. All good projects are chosen
(N2 ), plus all the bad ones matched with a corrupt agent (
Nh˜
2 ).
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The agent’s gain from corruption is
ΠCMA = b(1− eCMM )− g2 − h (12)
so that the threshold level h˜ is
h˜CM = b(1− eCMM )− g2 (13)
The agent accepts (hence h˜CM > 0), iff
b(1− eCMM ) > g2 (14)
The agent’s gain from corruption is decreasing in the manager’s monitor-
ing effort: the detection effect still holds. However, as equation (13) reveals,
now decentralisation has no direct effect on h˜, since h˜CM does not depend on
z. The loss from a bad project is born in any case, because now the corrupt
superior does not try to stop it. However, the full payment now is b+ bM .
If the manager is corrupt, decentralization tends to increase corruption.
However, the minimum payment clients have to make to be sure their project
is chosen is now larger. Therefore, only clients with high willingness to pay
will be able to pay.31 With respect to a situation with honest manager, the
extent of corruption can thus be lower if bM is very large.
7 When decentralization increases the bribe
In this section we generalize the model introduced above, assuming that a
change in the allocation of power also changes the amount the client is ready
to pay. Usually, the bribe a client is willing to make is larger the higher
the discretion of the agent he faces, for greater is the likelihood that he
obtains what he is paying for. It is still assumed that the manager cannot
be corrupted, so that corruption is ruled out.
Again, the manager and the agents are risk neutral. The bottom layer of
the hierarchy consists of N ≥ 2 agents.
Agents receive a private benefit g1 from a good project and a loss g2 from
a bad one.
Each agent has a private-information cost h of being corrupted, cost dis-
tributed uniformly in the population of agents over the interval [0, 1] .
We summarise the model briefly, to stress the differences introduced in
this new setting.
31A similar result can be found also in Banerjee (1997) and Carrillo (1995). Corruption
can be socially detrimental as it allocates resources to and promotes individuals with the
highest ability to pay, who are not necessarily the ones who deserve it.
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No corruption (first best) If all agents are honest, only good projects
are implemented. In this case the results in Section 2.5 still hold. Given that
(1) is everywhere decreasing in effort, the manager exerts only minimum
effort eM ≥ 0.
Corruption When corruption is possible, both good and bad projects are
suggested, bad ones provided that the clients who propose them offer the
agents a bribe b sufficiently high. The bribe is paid to the agent to report the
wrong information. Corruption then means that a bad project is presented
as a good one to the superior.
When the manager has formal authority, if she finds a bad project, she
can stop its implementation, which is a typical case of the exercise of veto
power. On the basis of the same information, the manager can take the agent
to court. The bribe is confiscated (a share s ≤ 1 given to the manager as a
reward for cooperation) and the agent is fired. If the agent is corrupt, the
probability of being caught depends on the central office’s effort and is equal
to eM . If the manager is not informed and Assumption 1 is satisfied, she
accepts the agent’s recommedation. Below, only cases where Assumption 1
holds will be considered.
When the agents have formal authority a bad project cannot be stopped
(by the same definition of formal authority). However, if the manager has
evidence that the project is bad , an agent can be convicted and the bribe
confiscated. The manager will get a share sb as a compensation.
A client with a bad project attributes a value v to its implementation.
His willingness to pay for corrupt services is therefore strictly linked to the
probability of having his project chosen. This probability is increasing in the
degree of decentralization z and decreasing in the manager’s effort eM . If the
agent has formal authority (which happens with probability z), the client is
sure to obtain implementation. If the manager has formal authority (case
with probability 1− z), the client has his project chosen only if the manager
is not informed, which, given her effort eM happens with probability 1− eM .
Therefore, the client’s willingness to pay is
b = [1− eM (1− z)] v (15)
The value v is common knowledge and agents have all the bargaining
power and can behave as perfectly discriminating monopolists, seizing the
entire client’s willingness to pay (15).
The agent’s gain from being corrupt is given again by (2)
ΠA = (1− eM) (b− g2)− eMzg2 − h
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Substituting b(z) from (15) in the expression above and rearranging terms,
the agent’s gain from corruption becomes
ΠA = [1− eM(1− z)] [(1− eM)v − g2]− h (16)
As long as ΠA > 0, the agent accepts the bribe. From (16), the value of
h that makes an agent just indifferent between being corrupt and not being
corrupt, given b and eM is
h˜ = [1− eM(1− z)] [(1− eM)v − g2] (17)
All agents with h < h˜ choose to be corrupt, whereas all those with h > h˜
prefer to remain honest.
In order for h˜ to be positive in equilibrium, given that 1− eM(1− z) > 0,
the term [(1− eM)v − g2] in (17) has to be positive too, i.e.
eM < e˜
′
M =
v − g2
v
(18)
Notice that 0 < e˜′M < 1 if v > g2. Then, if the loss to the agent is larger
than the client’s value of the project, corruption is not possible. Conversely,
if v is large, a relevant value e˜′M always exists.
Direct observation of (17) leads to the following result.
Lemma 5. Given eM , h˜ (hence the diffusion of corruption) is increasing in
z.
Proof. Straightforward, from differentiation of (5) with respect to z, given
that the inequality in (18) holds.
The Lemma above reverts the result in Lemma 1. This means that when
the bribe increases with decentralization more agent’s formal authority in-
creases corruption.
The manager chooses her monitoring effort eM after having observed the
agent’s report.
The manager’s payoff, conditional on a good report is still given by ex-
pression (4)
UB =
N
2
(
1 + h˜
){(
1− h˜
2
)
G1 +
h˜
2
[eMsb− (1− eM(1− z))G2]− eM2
}
The manager is rewarded with a share sb of the bribe if she denounces the
agent. We still assume that the manager is incorruptible. Therefore, any time
she is informed and the project is bad she reports that corruption occurred.
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Given z and s, set by the principal in the first stage of the game, the
manager’s first order condition is
h˜ (sb+ (1− z)G2)
2
− eM = 0
Substituting the above expression for the expected bribe b from (15) and
solving for eM , we find the manager’s reaction function to h˜ that takes into
account the changes in the expected bribe due to changes in monitoring effort
eM(h˜) =
h˜ (sv + (1− z)G2)
2 + svh˜(1− z) (19)
It is possible to show that the results in Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 still
hold.
Lemma 6. (i) The manager’s reaction function eM(h˜) is overall increasing
and strictly concave. (ii) corruption as a function of eM , h˜(eM), is discon-
tinuous at eM = e˜B. It is decreasing and convex for eM ∈ [0, e˜B) and then
jumps to 0 for eM ∈ (e˜B, 1] .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3. If v − g2 > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium (eM , h˜∗),
with eM ∈ [0, e˜B) and h˜∗ ∈ [0,min {v − g2, 1}].
Proof. See Appendix.
The main issue we want to investigate in this section is how equilibrium
corruption changes with decentralisation now that the bribe increases with
z.
Lemma 5 has shown that, for given eM , an increase in z increases corrup-
tion. We now check whether this result still holds in equilibrium, when eM
too changes.
Differentiating the manager’s reaction function given by (19) with respect
to z the following can be proved.
Lemma 7. Given h˜, the manager decreases her effort eM when z increases
if and only if h˜ < h˜G = 2G2s2v2 .
Proof. Straightforward, by differentiation of (19) with respect to z.
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Lemma 7 states that the manager exerts less effort following decentral-
ization if corruption is low. More decentralization causes a loss in control
to the manager, who now is less able to interfere with the agent’s decisions,
hence reduces her incentive to exert effort and bear the cost of it. This is
more likely to happen when G2, the loss the manager suffers from a bad
project, is high relative to the share of the bribe she receives if she discovers
and reports corruption, sv. Therefore, when G2 is high, the basic trade off
dominates and decentralization decreases the manager’s effort for any level
of corruption, h˜.
Conversely, if h˜ > h˜G = 2G2s2v2 , following decentralization, the manager’s
reaction function moves downward, implying a higher effort eM for any level
of h˜. In this second case, what we could term bribe-confiscation effect dom-
inates. This result is new and did not exist in the previous setting. It is
due to the increase in the size of the bribe caused by decentralisation, that
induce the manager to increase effort to receive a higher compensation. This
result reverts Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) basic trade off, according to which
delegation discourages the superior’s initiative, enhancing the subordinate’s
effort. If the bribe increases enough, the manager may put considerably
more effort in monitoring, thus leading to a decrease in corruption following
decentralisation . 32
Proposition 4. (i) When ∂eM∂z < 0, in equilibrium decentralization always
increases corruption, whereas deMdz is either positive (if the basic trade off
dominates) or negative (if the bribe-confiscation effect is relatively stronger).
(ii) When ∂eM∂z > 0, in equilibrium the bribe-confiscation effect dominates and
deM
dz > 0. corruption can either increase or decrease with decentralization.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the bribe-confiscation effect is strong enough, the agent’s expected de-
creases with decentralization and corruption is lower.
This result is rather counterintuitive, as it would be more straightforward
to figure out a situation where more decisional power to the people in direct
contact with bribers implies both a higher expected bribe and more propen-
sity to corruption. The key role here is played by the manager’s incentives
32To show that the sign of ∂eB∂z depends on the relative size of the basic trade off vs the
bribe confiscation effect, totally differentiate expression (7), that gives eB for given h˜ and
b. Obtain deBdz
(
2− h˜s ∂b∂eB
)
= h˜s ∂b∂z − 2G2. The l.h.s. is positive, since ∂b∂eB < 0. The r.h.s.
has an ambiguous sign. If the bribe confiscation effect h˜s ∂b∂z > 0 (recall
∂b
∂z > 0) is larger
than the basic trade off effect G2, then ∂eB∂z > 0 and vice-versa.
24
to monitor. If her reward increases with the number and amount of reported
bribes, decentralization can prove an effective device to fight corruption.
Notice that this conclusion still holds if the assumption that the manager
is incorruptible is released. In such case, the manager is still able to seize a
share of the bribe paid to the agent, but the amount of this share depends
on her bargaining power vis a` vis the agent. In any case, for corruption to be
possible it must be r > s, where r is the share the manager obtains in case
she colludes.33 Again decentralization, increasing the client’s willigness to
pay, triggers the bribe-confiscation effect and can curb corruption. This last
effect is even stronger in the event of corruption (being r > s), however the
desirability of decentralization can be lower from a social point of view than
in the no corruption case. In fact, resources are shared among the client, the
agent and the manager and there is no share 1 − s, however small, that is
redistributed to society.
8 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the effects of decentralization on the extent of cor-
ruption in a hierarchical organization, where decentralization here has been
defined as the delegation of control power to lower layers in the hierarchy. The
principal stipulates a grand-contract with all the subordinates in each layer
deciding how much control power to delegate them (all individuals placed at
the same level receive the same contract) and how to compensate them if
they report acts of corruption committed by their direct subordinates.
When decentralization is high, the low levels of an organization have more
discretion and are freer to supply illegal services, without having to worry
too much about being overruled by superiors. However, this does not lead
automatically to the conclusion that decentralization leads to more corrup-
tion. Decentralization causes a trade off between the superiors’ incentives
to monitor and the agent’s willingness to bear the (increasing) costs from
corruption. According to which aspect prevails in this trade off, more cen-
tralized and complex structures can be affected by corruption to a greater
extent, independently of the old argument that more complex organizations
suffer more from problems of corruption because of conditions of work over-
load. Superiors have to supervise a large number of agents, which certainly
reduces the amount of time and resources that can be spent on monitoring
each single agent.
33The share r must be strictly larger than s because it is plausible that, when the top
bureaucrat is indifferent between colluding and being honest, she would rather be honest.
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If the superior layers in charge of detecting and punishing corruption are
corrupt themselves, decentralisation actually increases corruption. However,
it also make it more expensive for corruptors to obtain what they want, thus
narrowing the set of people who can afford it.
If the bribe increases with decentralization, the larger expected loss to an
agent due to a higher probability that his choices go through is compensated
by the higher bribe. However, it is still the case that decentralisation reduces
the extent of corruption at the condition that the manager’s payoff is directly
proportional to the amount of bribes confiscated to agents. This assumption
is quite plausible even without assuming that a certain share of these bribes
is actually paid to her. It is easy to imagine that her reputation improves
substantially if she discovers serious cases of corruption, so that she derives
a higher private benefit.34
If the manager benefits more from uncovering more bribes, decentraliza-
tion can improve her incentives to monitor corrupt agents, thus increasing
the probability that they are caught and the expected costs from corruption
and it is again possible that decentralisation helps in controlling corruption.
A Appendix A: Proofs
A.0.1 Proof of Lemma 4
By the implicit function theorem, the impact of a change in s on equilibrium
e∗M is
de∗M
ds
=
∂e∗M
∂s
+
∂e∗M
∂h˜
dh˜∗
ds
(20)
whereas the impact on equilibrium corruption is
dh˜∗
ds
=
∂h˜∗
∂eM
de∗M
ds
(21)
as the direct effect ∂h˜
∗
∂s = 0. If there is corruption in the system (i.e. e
∗
M < e˜M)
then, by Lemma 2, ∂h˜
∗
∂eM
< 0. Therefore (21) reveals that dh˜
∗
ds ≷ 0 iff
de∗M
ds ≶ 0.
34In Italy, during the ”clean hands” phase, many magistrates were involved in the
investigation and prosecution of corrupt acts. However, it was those who handled the
most serious cases, where huge bribes had been exchanged, who got the highest benefits,
in terms of popularity, promotions and successful entry into the political stage.
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The sign of de
∗
M
ds depends entirely on the sign of
∂e∗M
∂s . To show this, sub-
stitute (21) into (20) and solve out for de
∗
M
ds
de∗M
ds
=
∂e∗M
∂s
1− ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
(22)
Notice that 1− ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
> 0, as ∂e
∗
M
∂h˜
> 0 by Lemma 3 and ∂h˜
∗
∂eM
< 0. Therefore
sign
[
de∗M
ds
]
= sign
[
∂e∗M
∂s
]
. Then we have proved that dh˜
∗
ds < 0, given that
∂e∗M
∂s > 0.
A.0.2 Proof of Proposition 2
By the implicit function theorem, the effect of a change in z on equilibrium
effort can be written
de∗M
dz
=
∂e∗M
∂z
+
∂e∗M
∂h˜
dh˜∗
dz
(23)
where ∂e
∗
M
∂z is the direct effect and is negative whereas
∂e∗M
∂h˜
is the manager’s
reaction to an increase in the expected level of corruption and is positive by
Lemma 3.
The effect of a change in z on equilibrium corruption, always by the
implicit function theorem, is
dh˜∗
dz
=
∂h˜∗
∂z
+
∂h˜∗
∂eM
de∗M
dz
(24)
where ∂h˜
∗
∂z < 0 by Lemma 1 and
∂h˜∗
∂eM
< 0 by Lemma 2.
Solving (23) and (24) de
∗
M
dz is
de∗M
dz
=
∂e∗M
∂z +
∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂z
1− ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
(25)
and
dh˜∗
dz
=
∂h˜∗
∂z +
∂h˜∗
∂eM
∂e∗M
∂z
1− ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
(26)
Notice that 1 − ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
> 0 always. In (25), ∂e
∗
M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂z < 0. Therefore,
given that ∂e
∗
M
∂z < 0 (basic trade off),
de∗M
dz < 0 always. This proves part (i) of
Proposition 2.
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In (26), ∂e
∗
M
∂z < 0, then
∂h˜∗
∂eM
∂e∗M
∂z > 0. Thus, if
∂h˜∗
∂z <
∂h˜∗
∂eM
∂e∗M
∂z (basic trade
off dominates) then dh˜
∗
dz > 0 and equilibrium corruption increases with decen-
tralization . If ∂h˜
∗
∂z >
∂h˜∗
∂eM
∂e∗M
∂z then
dh˜∗
dz < 0 and corruption decreases. This
proves part (ii).
A.0.3 Proof of Lemma 6
The first part of Lemma 5 is proved by differentiation of (19). The second
part follows from (17). When eM < e˜M , then ∂h˜∂eM < 0 from (17) and
∂2h˜
∂e2M
=
2(1 − z)v > 0. At eM = e˜M , h˜(e˜M) = 0 and when eM > e˜M then h˜ < 0, so
that, by definition of h˜, h˜ = 0.
A.0.4 Proof of Proposition 3
If v − g2 < 0 then h˜ < 0, then, by definition of h˜, h˜ = 0 and corruption is
not possible. Assume v − g2 > 0. Then, if eM = 0, h˜(0) = min {v − g2, 1} .
From (17) h˜(eM) is decreasing and convex for eM ∈ [0, e˜M) , at e˜M there
is a discontinuity, so that h˜(eM) jumps to 0. Conversely, the inverse of the
manager’s reaction function, h˜−1M (eM) is always increasing and convex in eM .
Therefore, the two schedules will cross at a point (e∗M , h˜∗), with e∗M ∈ [0, e˜M)
and h˜∗ ∈ [0,min {v − g2, 1}].
A.0.5 Proof of Proposition 4
By the implicit function theorem, the effect of a change in z on equilibrium
effort can be written
de∗M
dz
=
∂e∗M
∂z
+
∂e∗M
∂h˜
dh˜∗
dz
(27)
where ∂e
∗
M
∂z is the direct effect and is negative when h˜ < h˜G, positive otherwise,
by Lemma 8 and ∂e
∗
M
∂h˜
is the reaction of the manager to an increase in the
expected level of corruption in the organization and is positive by Lemma 6.
The effect of a change in z on equilibrium corruption, always by the
implicit function theorem, is
dh˜∗
dz
=
∂h˜∗
∂z
+
∂h˜∗
∂eM
de∗M
dz
(28)
where ∂h˜
∗
∂z > 0 by Lemma 5 and
∂h˜∗
∂eM
< 0 if eM < e˜M .
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Solving (27) and (28) de
∗
M
dz is
de∗M
dz
=
∂e∗M
∂z +
∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂z
1− ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
(29)
and
dh˜∗
dz
=
∂h˜∗
∂z +
∂h˜∗
∂eM
∂e∗M
∂z
1− ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
(30)
Notice that 1− ∂e∗M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂eM
> 0 always. From (30), if ∂e
∗
M
∂z < 0, then
∂h˜∗
∂eM
∂e∗M
∂z >
0. Thus, if ∂e
∗
M
∂z < 0,
dh˜∗
dz > 0 always. Equilibrium corruption increases with
decentralization.
In (29), ∂e
∗
M
∂h˜
∂h˜∗
∂z > 0. Therefore, if h˜ < h˜G, so that
∂e∗M
∂z < 0 (the basic trade
off dominates), sign
[
de∗M
dz
]
is ambiguous, positive if
∣∣∣∂e∗M∂z ∣∣∣ is small, negative
if
∣∣∣∂e∗M∂z ∣∣∣ is large enough. This proves part (i) of Proposition 4.
Conversely, if h˜ > h˜G, then
∂e∗M
∂z > 0 (the bribe-confiscation effect domi-
nates). In that case, sign
[
de∗M
dz
]
> 0 always. According to (30), this leads to
a decrease in equilibrium corruption iff
∣∣∣ ∂h˜∗∂eM de∗Mdz ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂h˜∗∂z ∣∣∣. This proves part
(ii).
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Figure 1:Timing of the game
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Figure 2:Equilibrium Corruption
- φ(eM)
e˜MeM ∗
h˜∗



h˜(eM)
h˜
eM
6
-
1
33
